Home › Battery Technology › The Metals Company's seabed mining pilot hasn't proven the output needed for commercial battery-metal production
Battery Technology

The Metals Company's seabed mining pilot hasn't proven the output needed for commercial battery-metal production

calendar_today
schedule 6 min read
Four bars compare 2022 pilot collection rate of 86.4 wet tons/hour with required 200, 300 and 600 wet tons/hour for 1M, 1.5M and 3M wet tons annually at 5,000 productive hours.

Summary

TMC recovered 3,021 wet tons of nodules in its 2022 pilot and hit 86.4 wet tons per hour, but its million-ton-per-year targets require 200-600 tons per hour sustained over thousands of productive hours. The company's phased plan defers demonstration of those commercial production rates, leaving the economics of seabed-sourced battery metals unproven.

In 2022, The Metals Company (TMC) and offshore contractor Allseas recovered 3,021 wet tons of nodules from the Pacific seabed. Their integrated test system moved material up a riser stretching more than four kilometres from the ocean floor to the Hidden Gem. During production runs, the collector achieved 86.4 wet tons per hour. Four years later, TMC is discussing a million tons a year from an upgraded system and eventually 12 million tons annually across four vessels.

What matters between those endpoints is the operating record: sustained collection rates, marine maintenance, vessel availability and delivered tons sufficient to carry fixed costs. TMC has yet to demonstrate those economics.

The November 12, 2026 corporate update describes a phased approach: begin with an upgraded pilot collector and limited modifications to Hidden Gem, then invest in larger systems as operations develop. Phasing reduces the initial capital commitment. It also pushes the demonstration of the projected commercial production rates into the future.

The annual arithmetic is straightforward. At 5,000 productive hours, about 57% of a calendar year, a system collecting 200 wet tons per hour delivers one million tons. The second-year target of 1.5 million tons requires 300 tons per hour. Three million tons from one production system requires 600 tons per hour. TMC’s 2022 production-run rate of 86.4 tons per hour would deliver 432,000 tons at that utilization.

Four bars compare 2022 pilot collection rate of 86.4 wet tons/hour with required 200, 300 and 600 wet tons/hour for 1M, 1.5M and 3M wet tons annually at 5,000 productive hours.
TMC’s 2022 pilot achieved 86.4 wet tons/hour during production runs. At an illustrative 5,000 productive hours/year, reaching 1 million, 1.5 million or 3 million wet tons requires 200, 300 or 600 tons/hour. The future upgraded equipment differs from the pilot.

The upgraded machines are expected to be different from the 2022 test collector. Their performance must be demonstrated, not assumed from the pilot. The operating gap is central to the project economics, and it grows with production ambitions.

The full TFIE Strategy Briefing examines TMC’s production gap alongside Impossible Metals’ autonomous collection model and the investment consequences of underperforming equipment. The source assessment and fleet sensitivities are linked there.

A collector, a multi-kilometre hydraulic riser and a production vessel have to work together. The crawler encounters uneven ground and varying nodule coverage. The riser and pumps handle abrasive slurry. The vessel must remain on station while crews inspect, maintain and repair equipment. Offshore access and weather affect when those activities can occur.

A system can produce at its test rate and still lose the year on maintenance and interruptions. Fewer productive hours push the required hourly rate higher. Repeating a successful short production run does not establish a year’s availability, let alone multiple years of fleet productivity.

The difference matters because capital and offshore operating costs continue while production is interrupted. Ships, crews, marine maintenance equipment and financing cost money whether or not nodules are arriving on deck. Smaller annual production spreads fixed expenses over fewer tons and raises the cost of every ton recovered.

TMC’s August 2025 prefeasibility presentation estimated offshore collection and transport at $179 per dry ton, or about $129 per wet ton under its 28% moisture assumption. Those are projections for a future system. They are not an audited cost record from continuous industrial mining. The revised first-production configuration needs its own cost data.

The missing commercial evidence is a long enough operating record to estimate productive hours, rate degradation, planned and unplanned maintenance, retrieval time, replacement costs and the delivered cost per ton. Until then, moving from a pilot to a production forecast remains a major assumption.

Impossible Metals proposes to collect individual nodules with autonomous underwater vehicles rather than a tracked crawler and riser. A vehicle would descend, select nodules, fill its cargo compartment, return, undergo surface recovery, unload and prepare for another mission. Every trip must be repeated across an entire fleet.

Its September 2026 scientific trial, reported by Reuters, recovered approximately 450 grams of nodules from more than 4,000 metres depth. It demonstrated selective scientific collection. A commercial robot would have to carry vastly more material and sustain cycle times and availability that the experiment did not measure.

In the 2025 commercial concept examined by metallurgical specialist Lyle Trytten and me, each proposed vehicle carried 12 tons of nodules and had 18 collection arms. At one nodule every 1.5 seconds per arm and an average nodule mass of 100 grams, filling the cargo requires roughly 120,000 successful picks. With all arms continuously working, collection alone occupies approximately 2.8 hours.

The proposed complete mission cycle was four hours. Descent, ascent, searching, repositioning, failed picks, recovery, unloading, inspection and relaunch also consume time. The architecture has too many interdependent activities to fit those requirements into that cycle at the assumed performance.

Autonomous navigation and manipulator tests cannot substitute for evidence of an entire fleet repeatedly executing commercial missions. Increasing payload changes vehicle weight, buoyancy, energy use and recovery equipment. Faster picking leaves the surface operation and deepwater transit to be solved.

Our 2025 independent techno-economic assessment tested the financial effects of weaker-than-assumed robot productivity. At the illustrative $180 per dry ton nodule sales value, the model required approximately $2.52 billion in capital with the originally assumed robot throughput. Halving throughput while maintaining output increased required capital to approximately $4.51 billion.

At a 10% discount rate, the modeled net present value moved from positive $863 million to negative $769 million. Even at two-thirds of original productivity, NPV fell to about $15 million, a negligible margin for a multibillion-dollar first-of-a-kind industrial fleet.

These are scenario calculations, not actual bills or calibrated probabilities. They identify the key failure mode: more robots, recovery capacity, batteries, vessels and maintenance are needed to compensate for each production shortfall. A financial model based on high productivity can look attractive until realistic availability and turnaround times are included.

TMC is further along technologically than Impossible Metals, but its future-scale production economics are also unsupported by a sustained operating record. Neither company has demonstrated the productive hours, throughput and maintenance costs needed to support its advertised commercial proposition.

Policymakers and investors should ask for extended end-to-end offshore operating records and audited unit economics before treating future production targets as investable output. The technology risk exists before accounting for nodule processing, metals markets, permitting or environmental liabilities.


The complete TFIE Briefing and linked assessment show the fleet calculations, technical assumptions and capital sensitivities. The remaining articles in the five-part series address processing, metals markets and American Samoa’s exposure.

Share this article

The Green Wire Weekly

Weekly deep dive into sustainable transport.

Comments

No approved comments yet. Be the first to comment.

Leave A Reply

Comments are temporarily unavailable.

Related Coverage